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PROLOGUE 
Professor Vernellia Randall and I had a conversation recently in 
which she described to me the kinds of negative responses she gets to her 
marvelous website on race and health law. 1 She organized the responses 
into three categories: (/) those which simply spewed generic obscenities at 
her; (2) those which spewed specific racial obscenities; and (3) those 
which raised objections based upon more traditional arguments such as 
"colorblindness. ,,2 She related to me how she initially tried to answer and 
engage those objections in the third category, but that she soon realized 
that it was a mistake. 3 
I asked whether the primary reason she stopped was her sense of 
futility or merely having too little time to respond, to which she answered, 
"neither.,,4 "Too often," she said, as the dialogue went on and her 
correspondents were unable to convince her of the error of her ways, these 
"rational objections" slowly degenerated into those of the first two 
categories. 5 While we laughed together about the irony, the laughter was 
bittersweet because it confirmed to both of us how lying underneath the 
shallow surface of many "rational" objections to the struggle for racial 
equity lurk the same unseemly and violent attitudes that have historically 
marked American racism. 6 In an even larger sense, it confirms that we 
often have as much, perhaps even more, to fear from that which is hidden 
than from that which is apparent. 
Mari Matsuda puts it another way: "[tJ here is naked power, which 
grabs and smashes without need for denial or justification. There is 
legitimized power, which justifies without denying. There is masked power, 
1. Conversation with Vemellia R. Randall, Professor of Law, University of Dayton 
School of Law, at a Law School Admissions Council conference in Seattle, Wash. (June 19, 
2002) [hereinafter Randall, Conversation]. Professor Randall's websites may be found at: 
Vemellia R. Randall, Race, HealthCare and the Law, at http://academic.udayton.edulhealthl 
(last modified Sept. 9, 2003); Vemellia R. Randall, Race, Racism and the Law, at 
http://academic.udayton.edulrace/ (last modified Nov. 13,2003). 




6. !d.; see Danielle Conway-Jones, Beyond Rice v. Cayetano: It's Impacts and 
Progeny: The Perpetuation of Privilege and Anti-Affirmative Action Sentiment in Rice v. 
Cayetano, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'y J. 7 n.13 (2002) (citing Elizabeth S. Anderson, What 
Are Racism and Sexism?, Race, Gender, and Affirmative Action, at http://www-
personal.umich.edul-eandersnlbiblio.htm (last modified June 2003» (identifying three 
different types of racism other than overt racism: unconscious/covert racism; racism by 
proxy in which a pretextual basis for discrimination is accepted because it tracks race; and. 
institutional racism, which systemically perpetuates the legacy of discrimination). 
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which never justifies, because the denial of its own existence is complete. ,,7 
INTRODUCTION 
We pride ourselves that we are a nation ruled by law.8 We take 
comfort in the fact that law seems to provide a way to escape the 
arbitrariness of the caprice and prejudice of the powerful. Yet, because the 
rule of law is inherently bound to issues of societal power and privilege, the 
rule of law is not always the triumph of justice. 9 
It is the law that has been the catalyst and mechanism for both 
progress and reaction. More than simply a tool to wield power and/or wrest 
it, its operation is clothed in an almost mystical aura of objectivity and 
neutrality. Indeed, it is that aura that gives it the immense power and 
influence it has. lo But the law has never been value free. I I It condoned and 
7. Mari J. Matsuda, Foreword: McCarthyism, The Internment and the Contradictions 
o/Power, 40 B.C. L. REV. 9, 9 (1998). 
8. Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over the "Other": Indians, 
Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs To Incorporate 
International Law, 20 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 427, 428 (2002) [hereinafter Saito, Asserting 
Plenary Power Over the "Other"] ("The United States portrays itself as a nation of laws, 
laws that give optimal protection to human rights and democratic processes, laws that apply 
equally to all 'citizens' and 'fairly' to all others within its jurisdiction" (citations omitted)}. 
9. E.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Introduction to CRJTlCAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY 
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) 
(explaining that critical race theory attempts to show the relationship between racial 
subordination and abstract notions such as "the rule of law" and to understand the 
relationship between racial power and law). 
10. See, e.g., ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION: LAW AND 
THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 12 (2001) [hereinafter YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, 
RIGHTS, AND REPARATION). Yamamoto stated: 
Id. 
Since the 1980s and '90s, critical legal scholars have offered strong critiques 
of the ostensible objectivity and neutrality of law and the legal process. These 
theoretical schools have drawn upon insights of legal realism from the 1930s and 
'40s. The legal realists argued that law was not an autonomous, self-contained 
discipline, nor was it objective .... 
. . . [Subsequently, Critical Legal Studies] posits that law and the legal process 
[is] largely a function of hidden politics .... CLS observed that ... legal 
decision-making tends to serve the interests of those in power while maintaining 
systemic legitimacy through the impression of legal neutrality .... 
. . . [Critical Race Theory] examines racial justice in connection with race, law 
and social structure. It recognizes that race is a social construction that plays an 
essential part in structuring and representing the social world. 
11. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Introduction to CRJTlCAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING 
EDGE xiv (Richard Delgado ed., 1995). Delgado writes: 
Because racism is an ingrained feature of our landscape, it looks ordinary and 
natural to persons in the culture. Formal equal opportunity-rules and laws that 
insist on treating blacks and whites (for example) alike-can thus remedy only the 
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celebrated slavery and segregation as well as outlawed it; 12 it created 
universal suffrage, although for years voting was restricted to one gender 
and one race; 13 it decides what is racist and what is not; 14 it decides who is 
of color and who is not and whether it matters; 15 it decides what is an 
inalienable right and what is not l6-in essence, law detennines who and 
what is protected from whom and from what. It is the basis of our 
interrelationship with one another, and it is simultaneously malleable and 
unyielding. It provides a mirror in which we can see our relationships to 
others and what we need to do to change it-if we can. 
After airplanes were rammed into the World Trade Center on 
September 11,2001, more than twin towers were destroyed. The American 
sense of invincibility was shattered that day as well, in a way that the 
United States was similarly stunned after Pearl Harbor. It was that sense of 
vulnerability in deadly combination with American racism that led to the 
imprisonment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Numerous 
legal scholars, echoing Justice Jackson's dissent in Korematsu v. United 
States,17 have warned that the Korematsu decision lies like a "loaded 
weapon" ready to be used in times of national stress. IS In the recent 
Id. 
more extreme and shocking sorts of injustice, the ones that do stand out. Formal 
equality can do little about the business-as-usual forms of racism that people of 
color confront every day and that account for much misery, alienation, and 
despair. 
... Starting from the premise that a culture constructs social reality in ways 
that promote its own self-interest (or that of elite groups), [critical race] scholars 
set out to construct a different reality. Our social world, with its rules, practices, 
assignments of prestige and power, is not fixed; rather, we construct it with 
words, stories, and silence. 
12. E.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (endorsing segregation 
doctrine). But see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding segregated 
education unconstitutional). 
13. E.g., U.S. CON ST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude."); U.S. CON ST. amend. XIX, § 1 ("The right of citizens ... to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged ... on account of sex."). 
14. E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377,391 (1992) (striking down a 
city ordinance prohibiting hate speech based on race, gender, and religion). 
15. E.g., Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 196-97 (1922) (holding "free white 
persons" eligible for naturalization did not include non-Caucasians). 
16. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (upholding a woman's right to 
terminate pregnancy). 
17. 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
18. E.g., Eric K. Yamamoto & Susan Kiyomi Serrano, The Loaded Weapon, 27/28 
AMERASIA J. 51,60-61 (2001-2002) ("Our collective task, then, is to tum Justice Jackson's 
warning into. . . an affirmative challenge. The time is now to unload that weapon."); Gil 
Gott, A Tale of New Precedents: Japanese American Internment as Foreign Affairs Law, 40 
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decision of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Fourth Circuit denied an inquiry into 
the facts alleged by the United States government that would justify an 
"enemy combatant" classification of an American citizen, essentially 
stripping him of all constitutional protections. 19 With that decision, the 
"loaded weapon" has been picked up, fired, and reloaded. 
But the troubling aspects of the Fourth Circuit's Hamdi decision are 
more complex and subtle than simply a repetition of Korematsu 's racial 
reasoning and explicitly racial result.2o Group racial stereotyping lies not 
directly at the heart of the Hamdi decision as it did in Korematsu, but 
indirectly.21 It is the response to a "hidden" racial message of anti-Muslim 
sentiment. In the same sense that the Korematsu court attempted, but failed, 
to de-emphasize the racial underpinnings of its decision, the Hamdi court 
was able to exploit racial messages without acknowledging them.22 
Moreover, the Hamdi decision also signals a response to a larger 
political agenda; the suppression of progressive movements and dissent 
reminiscent of the anti-communist crusades of the McCarthy era. At a time 
in which the United States' unilateral, acquisitive, and militarily aggressive 
foreign policy23 combines with a faltering domestic economy24 and a 
retreat from the progressive advances in areas such as civil rights of the 
previous decades,25 there is a necessity for the government to create an 
B.C. L. REv. 179,254 (1998) ("Jackson's reference to the loaded weapon implied the direct 
precedential effect the internment cases might have under the doctrine of stare decisis."). 
The "loaded weapon" is a reference to a phrase Justice Jackson used in his dissent in 
Korematsu: 
[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the 
Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution 
sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial 
discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The 
principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority 
that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition 
imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new 
purposes. 
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
19. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450,475 (4th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Hamdi III]. 
20. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222-23. 
21. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222-23; Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 462-77. 
22. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222-23; Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 462-77. 
23. E.g., David Sanger, Bush Says U.S. Willing To Go It Alone in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 7, 2003, at A I; see also, Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over the "Other," supra note 
8, at 428 ("[The United States'] international reputation is that of a state reluctant to ratify 
human rights agreements and unwilling to accept the jurisdiction of international decision-
making bodies."). 
24. E.g., Martin Wolk, U.s. Could Slip Back Into Recession: Grim Employment Report 
Suggests 'Double-Dip' Scenario, MSNBC NEWS, Mar. 7, 2003, at 
http://www.msnbc.comlnews/882218.asp. 
25. E.g., Janet Hook, Conservative Social Agenda a GOP Challenge; Activists Hope to 
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environment that will disrupt and chill domestic dissent and progressive 
political activism.26 Indeed, the provisions of such measures as the USA 
Patriot Act have already drastically curtailed civil liberties.27 So massive 
Make Headway on Key Issues with Republicans in Control of Congress, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
19, 2003, at A21 (reporting that the Bush administration has allied itself with anti-
affirmative action forces and anti-abortion activists). 
26. E.g., Philip A. Thomas, Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Powers: 9/J J: USA and UK, 
26 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1193, 1205 (2003). 
27. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
liS Stat. 272 (200 I). 
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has published two reports: FIONA DOHERTY 
ET AL., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IMBALANCE OF POWERS: How CHANGES TO 
U.S. LAW & POLICY SINCE 9/11 ERODE HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (2003), 
http://www.lchr.orglus_law/losslimbalance/powers.pdf [hereinafter DOHERTY ET AL., 
IMBALANCE OF POWERS] and FIONA DOHERTY ET AL., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
YEAR OF Loss: REEXAMINING CIVIL LIBERTIES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11 (2002), 
http://www.lchr.orglus_law/loss/lossJeport.pdf [hereinafter DOHERTY ET AL., YEAR OF 
Loss]. These reports comprehensively chronicle the government's extraordinary incursion 
into traditional civil liberties protections post-9fIl. DOHERTY ET AL., IMBALANCE OF 
POWERS, supra note 27; DOHERTY ET AL., YEAR OF Loss, supra note 27. The repressive 
activities have been organized into five sections: "Open Government"; The "Right to 
Privacy"; "Treatment of Immigrants, Refugees and Minorities"; The "Security Detainees 
and the Criminal Justice System"; and "The United States and International Human Rights 
Protection." DOHERTY ET AL., IMBALANCE OF POWERS, supra note 27, at ii-iii. The following 
is the basic overview of the reports: 
An analysis of challenges to the principle of Open Government covers 
increasing government secrecy and attempts to limit public debate. This includes 
withholding from Congress information on the implementation of the USA 
PATRIOT Act; obstructing investigations by the General Accounting Office, the 
investigative arm of Congress; and the secretive process with which new draft 
anti-terrorism legislation has been prepared by the Department of Justice .... 
The erosion of the Right to Privacy is illustrated by a series of initiatives by 
which federal powers of surveillance, search and seizure, and intelligence 
gathering have been vastly extended in ways that may affect everyone in the 
United States. They include the military's Total Information Awareness Program 
to create data profiles on citizens by tapping and "mining" public and private 
databases; the use of expanded search and seizure powers under the USA 
PATRIOT Act to seize library, bookstore, and other private records; increased 
powers to intercept telephone and internet communications; and the lifting of 
restrictions on the use of special foreign intelligence powers in ordinary criminal 
prosecutions. Federal proposals also would lift restrictions on monitoring and 
surveillance ofthe ordinary citizen by city and state police .... 
In assessing the Treatment of Immigrants, Refugees, and Minorities, this 
report addresses the way some immigrant communities have continued to bear the 
brunt of many of the Justice Department's anti-terrorism initiatives ... [such as] 
the monitoring, registration, detention, and secret deportation of immigrants 
against whom no charges [would] have been made; restrictions on visitors and 
irnmigrants alike from many parts of the world; and a reversal of the United 
States' traditional welcome to refugees fleeing persecution abroad .... 
A description of the ... Security Detainees and the Criminal Justice System 
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has this assault been by the Bush administration's Attorney General, John 
Ashcroft, that even traditionally conservative politicians such as former 
Republican House Majority Leader Richard Armey have expressed disquiet 
about his policies and initiatives?8 
Thus, like Korematsu, the Hamdi decision is deeply entrenched in 
political value judgments and assumptions, but comes clothed in the 
rhetoric of military necessity and cloaked in the legitimacy and 
"objectivity" of law: 
[N]ational security crises coupled with racism or nativism and 
backed by the force of law generate deep and lasting social 
injustice. Court rulings in particular legitimize even extreme, 
albeit popular, governmental actions-in the 1940s, the 
internment; yesterday [an immigrant's] ... secret incarceration; 
today, potentially racial profiling and harassment. Once 
legitimated by courts, government excesses and human suffering 
take on the mantle ofnormalcy.29 
In essence, the Hamdi decision "legitimizes" two converging and 
complementary forces: the necessity to define national identity in 
relationship to a racialized "Other" and the use of that national identity to 
promote and justify an agenda of suppressing progressive movements, 
which threaten a right-wing political vision for this country's future. 30 It 
covers the increasing reliance on ad hoc measures the United States has created to 
deal with those suspected of ties to al Qaeda, including: the indefinite detention of 
U.S. citizens, the proposed use of military commissions, and the status of 
detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At issue also is the power of the 
presidency to identify any American citizen as an agent of an enemy and on that 
basis to strip that citizen of his or her liberty and other rights under U.S. law .... 
The final chapter of the reports concerns the United States and International 
Human Rights Protection - the international repercussions of the changes in U.S. 
policy and practice. The examples presented show that some of the most 
draconian aspects of what the U.S. government has done in response to September 
11 are being mimicked by repressive governments to justify human rights 
violations against peaceful advocates of democratic values. 
Id. at ii-iii. For an account of the legislative history of the USA Patriot Act as well as an 
overview of the Bush administration's early reaction to September 11, including the 
President's Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001), 
that authorized the use of military commissions to try suspected terrorists, see Christopher 
Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CON ST. L.Q. 373, 373 (2002). 
28. Eric Lichtblau & Adam Liptak, Threats and Responses; On Terror, Spying and 
Guns, Ashcroft Expands Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,2003, at AI ("The former Republican 
congressman Dick Armey, on his way out the door last year as House majority leader, said 
he thought Mr. Ashcroft and the Justice Department were 'out of control. "'). 
29. Yamamoto & Serrano, supra note 18, at 57. 
30. Gott, supra note 18, at 252. As Gil Gott aptly observes: 
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should corne as no accident or surprise that the Fourth Circuit is considered 
one of the most politically conservative courts in the country. 31 
In this sense, the Hamdi decision and its implications are even more 
problematic and sobering than Korematsu. Korematsu's racial persecution 
of Japanese Americans aided a war effort by strengthening a white 
American racial identity against an Asiatic foreign power.32 Hamdi, on the 
other hand, uses an underlying racial construction of a terrorist "Other" to 
facilitate not only America's foreign policy objectives, but a larger and on-
going right-wing social and political domestic agenda.33 It is the morphing 
together of these two repressive American themes-the racism of 
Korematsu's presumptively disloyal foreigner and the suppression of 
presumptively "unAmerican" progressive ideas and social movements as 
exemplified by, but not limited to, the McCarthy era34-made to appear 
[T]he meanings attached by actors to national security, not "real threats out there," are 
of primary significance .... 
National security is, in this sense, a metaphor that ascribes to "the nation" the 
ability to perceive safety and well-being .... [and] collapses the multiplicity of 
society into a monolithic sameness of nation. . .. National interest and thus 
determinations of national security, assumed to be legitimate and rational, are 
valorized when set over against their Other-a realm of purely passionate and 
chaotic non-security and the non-rationality of interest misperception. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
31. E.g., Mary R. Falk, Shooting from the Lip: United States v. Dickerson, Role 
[ImJmorality, and the Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U. HAW. L. REv. 1,32 n.140 (2000). 
Journalists routinely discuss the political predilections of judges. Id. For example, The New 
York Times has reported that the Fourth Circuit is known as a "model of conservative 
pursuits." Id. (quoting Neil A. Lewis, A Court Becomes a Model of Conservative Pursuits, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1999, at AI, A22); Clay Calvert & Kelly Lyon, Reporting on Child 
Pornography: A First Amendment Defense for Viewing Illegal Images?, 89 Ky. L.J. 13, 50 
(2000) (describing the Fourth Circuit as "traditionally one of the most conservative appellate 
courts in the United States .... "). 
32. Gott, supra note 18, at 269. Gott adds: "[t]he racial unity ... in the judicial voice of 
Korematsu and Hirabayashi provided a kind of historical counterpoint-thus aiding in the 
restoration of America's constitutive Anglo-Saxon unity-precisely at the quintessential 
modern nation state-defining moment, 'wartime.'" Id. (citing JURGEN HABERMAS, 
COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 190-91 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 
Beacon Press 1979». 
It should also be pointed out that the Japanese American internment was in part 
motivated by economic interests as well: "[p]art of the cry for Japanese-American 
internment was raised by 'influential agriculturalists who had long cast their covetous eyes 
over the coastal webwork of rich Japanese-owned land, a superb opportunity had thus 
become theirs for the long-sought expUlsion of an unwanted minority.'" Chris K. Iijima, 
Reparations and the "Model Minority" Ideology of Acquiescence: The Necessity to Refuse 
the Return to Original Humiliation, 40 B.C. L. REv. 385, 394 n.28 (1998) (quoting MICHl 
WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS 36 
(1976». 
33. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text. 
34. Natsu Taylor Saito, Seventh Annual Latcrit Conference, Latcrit VII, Coalition 
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neutral by judicial rhetoric, that holds tremendous dangers for generations 
to come. 
I. HAMDI V. RUMSFELD: WHEN JUDICIAL REVIEW IS A COVER FOR 
GOVERNMENTAL IMPUNITY 
On January 8, 2003, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a 
declaration by Michael Mobbs, a Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy (the Mobbs Declaration) that set forth the circumstances 
of the detention of Yaser Esam Hamdi, an American citizen, as an "enemy 
combatant" was sufficient "by itself' to justify his detention.35 The 
designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant was not merely a technical 
classification, but one which stripped Hamdi of practically every 
constitutional right afforded an American citizen deprived of his or her 
liberty interest,36 including ones as basic as the right to counsel, knowledge 
of the specific charges, and access to a judicial tribunal.37 
The district court below, United States District Judge Robert Doumar, 
had been instructed earlier by the Fourth Circuit to consider the sufficiency 
of the Mobbs Declaration,38 and on August 16, 2002, it found that the 
Mobbs Declaration fell "far short of supporting" Hamdi's incarceration and 
ordered the government to produce numerous documents related to the 
Theory and Praxis: Social Justice Movements and Lateril Community - Part II Latcritical 
Perspectives: Individual Liberties, State Security, and the War on Terrorism: Whose 
Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of COIN TEL PRO and the 
Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REv. 1051, 1066 (2002) [hereinafter 
Saito, Seventh Annual Lateril Conference]. "A consistently emerging theme in the 
suppression of political dissent is that those who disagree with government policy are 
labeled 'unAmerican' and, whenever possible, portrayed as agents of foreign powers." Id. 
35. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003). 
36. Hamdi v. Rurnsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 282-83 (4th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Hamdi II] 
(reversing a district court order mandating that Hamdi be allowed to meet with his attorney, 
in this case the public defender). Hamdi, after his capture in Afghanistan was held initially 
at Camp X-Ray at the Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and was subsequently 
transferred to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig. Id. at 280; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 
F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Hamdi I]. 
37. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 532 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14,2002), rev'd, 316 
F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Hamdi District Court]. 
38. !d. at 530. The Mobbs Declaration was attached to the government's response to a 
petition by Hamdi for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 528, 533. It confirmed the factual 
allegations that Hamdi was seized in Afghanistan by allied forces during the United States' 
military campaign there and had been designated at that time as an "enemy combatant." 
Hamdi Ill, 316 F.3d at 461. The declaration alleged that Hamdi had traveled to Afghanistan 
in July or August of 2001; affiliated with a Taliban unit; received weapons training; "was 
captured when his Taliban unit surrendered to Northern Alliance forces"; and that at the 
time of surrender was in possession of an AK-47 rifle. Id. The Mobbs Declaration consisted 
of two pages and nine paragraphs. Hamdi District Court, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 533. 
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circumstances of Hamdi's capture and detention.39 These documents 
included copies of Hamdi' s statements and the notes and identities of his 
interrogators.4o 
The district court characterized the Mobbs Declaration as "little more 
than the government's 'say-so'" and went on to state that if it "were to 
accept the Mobbs Declaration as sufficient justification" for Hamdi's 
detention, "it would in effect be abdicating any semblance of the most 
minimal level of judicial review. In effect, this Court would be acting as 
little more than a rubber-stamp.'>41 Judge Doumar concluded with an 
impassioned plea for due process: 
The warlords of Afghanistan may have been in the business of 
pillage and plunder. We cannot descend to their standards without 
debasing ourselves. We must preserve the rights afforded to us by 
our Constitution and laws for without it we return to the chaos of 
a rule of men and not of laws .... While the Executive may very 
well be correct that Hamdi is an enemy combatant whose rights 
have not been violated, the Court is unwilling, on the sparse facts 
before it to find so at this time on the basis of the Mobbs 
Declaration.42 
Despite the district court's strongly worded viewpoint, the Fourth 
Circuit sustained the government's appeal and held that "[n]o further 
factual inquiry [was] necessary or proper,>43 and further sustained the 
government's objection to the production of evidence related to the Mobbs 
Declaration.44 
The Fourth, Circuit reasoned that the government was entitled to 
"great deference" when dealing with matters "'implicating sensitive 
matters of foreign policy, national security, or military affairs. ,,>45 It went 
39. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 462. In fact, the district court questioned the government's 
fundamental assertion that Hamdi was affiliated with the Taliban: 
[The Mobbs Declaration] states that Hamdi was "affiliated with a Taliban military 
unit and received weapons training." The declaration makes no effort to explain 
what "affiliated" means nor under what criteria this "affiliation" justified Hamdi's 
classification as an enemy combatant. The declaration is silent as to what level of 
"affiliation" is necessary to warrant enemy combatant status .... Indeed, a close 
inspection of the declaration reveals that [it] never claims that Hamdi was fighting 
for the Taliban, nor that he was a member of the Taliban. 
Hamdi District Court, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 534 (internal citations omitted). 
40. Hamdi /II, 316 F.3d at 462. 
41. Hamdi District Court, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 535. 
42. Id. at 536. 
43. Hamdi /II, 316 F.3d at 459. 
44. Id. at 471. 
45. Id. at 463 (quoting Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281). 
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on to note that the procedural safeguards that ordinarily pertain to citizens 
in the area of "criminal prosecutions do not translate neatly to the arena of 
armed conflict .... [and] if deference to the executive is not exercised with 
respect to military judgments in the field, it is difficult to see where 
deference would ever obtain. ,,46 Yet, the exercise of judicial oversight in 
determining the sufficiency of the Mobbs Declaration was not, in essence, 
solely an issue of whether a court showed deference to "military 
judgment.'>47 It was, more fundamentally, a balancing of deference to 
"military judgment in the field" and the suspension of basic civil liberties 
for an individual American citizen.48 And in this regard the Fourth 
Circuit's "deference" bordered on complete abdication.49 In its twenty-
seven page decision, the Fourth Circuit devoted less than a dozen 
paragraphs to the fundamental question under its review: the sufficiency of 
the Mobbs Declaration.5o This is significant since the Fourth Circuit 
46. Id. at 465. The Fourth Circuit opined that detention of enemy combatants in lieu of 
prosecution served two purposes: preventing them "from rejoining the enemy" and relieving 
commanders of "litigating the circumstances of a capture halfway around the globe." Id. 
However, since the court itself confined itself to the rare and narrow context of "the 
undisputed detention of [an American] citizen during a combat operation undertaken in a 
foreign country and a determination by the executive that the citizen was allied with enemy 
forces," it is hard to imagine that the burden of prosecution in those specific and narrow 
circumstances would be greatly burdensome or prejudicial to the military effort. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. !d. 
49. Id. at 472. 
50. Id. at 466-69. The bulk of the Hamdi III opinion addressed issues of whether 
assuming the government's assertions about Hamdi were valid and whether Hamdi's 
detention would be consequently constitutionally impermissible as a matter of law. Id. at 
464-69, 471-76. While these issues are of immense import, they are beyond the limited 
scope of this piece that solely focuses on the lack of judicial oversight and scrutiny of the 
government's assertions about Hamdi. Indeed, the necessity of courts testing the truth or 
falsity of those assertions to protect those who are innocent as well as to mete out 
appropriate justice to those who are guilty is precisely what this piece is advocating: 
The government must be empowered to repel actual threats to its existence. At the 
same time, especially in an era of expanding governmental control over its own 
citizens in response to perceived threats to national security, a constitutional 
democracy cannot afford to have its courts withdraw from their historically 
"watchful" role over the most cherished liberties of its people. 
Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited-Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary 
Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of National 
Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. I, 62 (1986) [hereinafter 
Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited]. 
It is worth noting that the Fourth Circuit failed to cite Korematsu, a clearly analogous 
case, perhaps because of Korematsu's troubled legacy and reputation. See, e.g., Alfred C. 
Yen, Introduction: Praising With Faint Damnation-The Troubling Rehabilitation of 
Korematsu, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1998). Moreover, it is even more ironic that the Fourth 
Circuit dismissed Hamdi's argument that his detention as a United States citizen was barred 
by 18 § U.S.C. 4001(a) (2000) ("No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the 
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acknowledged early in its opinion that the duty of the judiciary to protect 
"individual freedoms does not simply cease" in wartime.51 In fact, it quoted 
Ex parte Milligan52 for the proposition that the jUdiciary should be wary 
since there could come a time when government would "seek by sharp and 
decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and proper; and that the 
principles of constitutional liberty would be in peril .... ,,53 Yet, despite 
United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.") partly on the grounds that § 4001(a) 
had "functioned principally to repeal the Emergency Detention Act," the thrust of which, the 
Fourth Circuit opined, was inapplicable. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 467-68. 
The Fourth Circuit asserted that the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act (which 
originally provided for the detention of individuals '''likely to engage in espionage or 
sabotage' during 'internal security emergencies"') was enacted to prevent the recurrence of 
incidents such as the Japanese American internment. Id. at 468 (citing H.R. REp. No. 92-
116, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 u.S.C.C.A.N. 1435, 1436). Completely undiscussed was 
the fact that Hamdi's constitutional protections were suspended on the very grounds that the 
internment had been justified: military security. See Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 462-77. 
Instead, the Fourth Circuit relied principally upon Ex parte Quirin for the proposition 
that citizenship would not serve as a bar to the suspension of constitutional rights of a 
captured enemy belligerent. 317 U.S. 1,37 (1942). Yet, Professor Harold Koh has pointed 
out that, even in the case of non-citizens: 
Quirin nowhere gave the president carte blanche unilaterally to create an 
alternative military system of criminal justice for suspicious aliens captured 
abroad. Nor did Quirin authorize the president unilaterally to shift all cases 
involving war crimes by detained noncitizens into military commissions. In 
Quirin, Congress had formally declared war, which it has not done here, and had 
specifically authorized the use of military commissions in its Articles of War. 
Harold Hongju Koh, Agora: Military Commissions: The Case Against Military 
Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 340 (2002) (citations omitted). Moreover, it has been 
pointed out that, while there was an issue of whether military tribunals were constitutionally 
permissible, nowhere in Ex parte Quirin is there a proposition that enemy combatant status 
justifies the restriction of all basic due process protections. See Margaret Chon & Eric K. 
Yamamoto, Resurrecting Korematsu: Post-September 11th National Security Curtailment of 
Civil Liberties, RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN 
INTERNMENT 9 (July 8, 2003), 
http://www I. law. ucla.edul-kangiracerightsreparationlUpdateCh8/chonyarnamotoracerightsc 
h8.pdf ("Moreover, the [Ex parte Quirin] Court made clear that the government's enemy 
combatant designation was subject to judicial review and that enemy combatants have 
standing to contest convictions for war crimes by habeas corpus proceedings."). 
51. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 464. 
52. 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
53. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 464 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 120). Citing Ex 
parte Milligan for the sole proposition that courts should review citizen detentions is the 
legal equivalent of asserting that Moby Dick was a story about a whale. 
Ex parte Milligan was a Civil War case in which a citizen had been sentenced by a 
military commission to death for participation in an armed rebellion against the United 
States. 71 U.S. at 6-8. The Supreme Court granted his writ of habeas corpus and held that 
his conviction violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth amendments. !d. at 119. It held that only 
when "courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice 
according to law .... " that military law may be exercised against citizen civilians. Id. at 
127. Moreover, the Court held that martial rule was limited by the duration of the necessity 
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this clear warning by the Ex parte Milligan Court of the necessity for courts 
to be mindful of constitutional protections in the midst of perilous times, 
the Fourth Circuit bloodlessly concluded that Ex parte Milligan stood 
merely for the elemental proposition that "[t]he detention of United States 
citizens must be subject to judicial review."s4 
It simply stated, without authority or explanation, that the production 
of the government notes of Hamdi's statements "may contain the most 
sensitive and the most valuable information for our forces in the field."ss 
However, even assuming the Fourth Circuit's speculation to be true, it is 
difficult to understand their fears given the ability by the government to 
redact sensitive intelligence information and to have such statements 
submitted under seal and in camera. 
The Fourth Circuit then went on to conclude that the simple 
production of a list of interrogators, copies of "statements by members of 
the Northern Alliance regarding Hamdi's surrender," the date of his 
capture, and "the dates and location of his subsequent detention" would 
make "litigation ... the driving force in effectuating and recording wartime 
detentions."s6 It grandly opined that the production of statements by 
Northern Al1iance members would "place a strain on multilateral efforts 
during wartime. "S7 
and the "locality of actual war." Id. 
Not that the Court was unconcerned about the dangers presented by the tumultuous 
times during the Civil War period. /d. at 130. The Court acknowledged in prophetic 
language that: 
[R]esistance becomes an enormous crime when it assumes the form of a secret 
political organization, armed to oppose the laws, and seeks by stealthy means to 
introduce the enemies of the country into peaceful communities .... Conspiracies 
like these, at such a juncture, are extremely perilous; and those concerned in them 
are dangerous enemies to their country, and should receive the heaviest penalties 
of the law, as an example to deter others from similar criminal conduct. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Yet, despite that concern, the Court strongly and passionately advocated the critical 
importance of the judiciary performing a "watchful care [ over] those [e ]ntrusted with the 
guardianship of the Constitution .... " particularly in times of great turmoil and passion. Id. 
at 124. In impassioned rhetoric the Court warned that: 
Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred ofliberty and contempt of law, may 
fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln; ... [Our Founding 
Fathers] knew-the history of the world told them-the nation they were 
founding, be its existence short or long, would be involved in war; how often or 
how long continued, human foresight could not tell; and that unlimited power, 
wherever lodged at such a time, was especially hazardous to freemen. 
Id. at 125. 
54. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 464 (citing Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 283). 
55. /d. at 470. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 471. 
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Given the magnitude of the Fourth Circuit's hyperbole, it is difficult 
to keep in perspective the fact that the case before it involved the narrow 
and rare circumstances of an individual American citizen detained on a 
foreign battlefield. 58 Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Fourth Circuit failed 
to acknowledge that only a few months earlier John Walker Lindh, an 
American citizen who was captured by American soldiers fighting with the 
Taliban in Afghanistan and who ultimately confessed to providing services 
as a Taliban soldier, was afforded the same constitutional protections 
denied Hamdi without any of the prejudice to either the Afghanistan war 
effort or the efficiency of the American military in general. 59 Yet the court 
concluded, in a stunning exercise of circular reasoning, that it need not 
further investigate the accuracy of the Mobbs declaration since the "factual 
averments in the affidavit, if accurate, are sufficient to confirm that 
Hamdi's detention conforms with a legitimate exercise of the war powers 
given the executive by [the Constitution].,,6o 
For the Fourth Circuit, the seizure of an American citizen abroad in a 
zone of active combat alone was sufficient to trigger the court's inability to 
test the executive's designation of that citizen as. an "enemy combatant.,,61 
It concluded: 
[W]e hold that, despite his status as an American citizen currently 
detained on American soil, Hamdi is not entitled to challenge the 
facts presented in the Mobbs declaration. Where, as here, a habeas 
petitioner has been designated an enemy combatant and it is 
undisputed that he was captured in an [sic] zone of active combat 
operations abroad, further judicial inquiry is unwarranted when 
the government has responded to the petition by setting forth 
factual assertions which would establish a legally valid basis for 
the petitioner's detention.62 
Thus, the Fourth Circuit clearly and unequivocally signaled that the test of 
the truth of the "factual assertions which would establish a legally valid 
basis for the petitioner's detention" was not within their judicial purview.63 
58. See id. at 459. 
59. See Leonard M. Baynes, Racial Profiling, September 11th and the Media: A 
Critical Race Theory Analysis, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. I, 37 (2002) (analyzing the media 
coverage and treatment of various post-September II terrorism prosecutions and concluding 
that race was a driving force in how specific factual incidents and defendants were portrayed 
and treated). 
60. Hamdi Ill, 316 F.3d at 473 (emphasis added). 
61. Id. at 459, 461-62. 
62. Id. at 476. 
63. Id. 
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The inquiry into the factual basis for the government's assertion of its 
heightened power during times of national security crisis is a question of 
crucial importance because it is in precisely this area that the government's 
historical actions have been most suspect. 64 In the infamous Korematsu 
case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a military exclusion 
order that excluded all persons of Japanese ancestry from certain areas of 
the West Coast.65 The conclusion of the Korematsu opinion is worth 
noting: 
It is said we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of 
a citizen in a concentration camp solely because of his ancestry, 
without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good 
disposition towards the United States. Our task would be simple, 
our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a 
loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice. 
Regardless of the true nature of the assembly and relocation 
centers-and we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration 
camps with all the ugly connotations that term implies-we are 
dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order.66 
This is a remarkable paragraph in the annals of jurisprudence. 
Although it was undisputed that Korematsu was a loyal American citizen 
and that the "obvious purpose of the [exclusion] order[] ... was to drive all 
citizens of Japanese ancestry into Assembly Centers,,,67 the Court grandly 
shrugged off any suggestion that this was a case dealing with "the 
imprisonment of a loyal citizen ... because of racial prejudice.,,68 Despite 
the fact that "exclusion [was] sought ... mainly upon questionable racial 
and sociological grounds not ordinarily within the realm of expert military 
judgment,,,69 the Court concluded that any suggestion of racial prejudice 
"merely confuses the issue.,,7o In a stunning aside, the Court revealed itself 
by stating that "[r]egardless of the true nature,,7l of the camps, the issue 
was one solely of the validity of the exclusion order and not the camps: 
64. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1994). 
65. Id. 
66. /d. at 223. 
67. Id. at 229 (Roberts, 1., dissenting). 
68. Id. at 223. 
69. Id. at 236-37 (Murphy, 1., dissenting). 
70. Id. at 223. 
71. Id. (emphasis added). 
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To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without 
reference to the real military dangers which were presented, 
merely confuses the issue .... [Japanese American exclusion was 
instituted] because the properly constituted military authorities 
feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take 
proper security measures, because they decided that the military 
urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese 
ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and 
finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of 
war in our military leaders-as inevitably it must-determined 
that they should have the power to do just this. There was 
evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities 
considered that the need for action was great, and time was 
short.72 
One can only assume the Court meant that even if the camps and the 
incarceration were the product of racism, the issue as the Court saw it was 
solely whether the Court should defer to the military's construction of what 
constituted a "military necessity.,,73 
Indeed, Justice Jackson, in chillingly prophetic words today, dissented 
and asked whether the Court could make a decision on the propriety of 
exclusion "having no real evidence before it" except an "unsworn, self-
serving statement, untested by any cross-examination, that what [was done] 
was reasonable.,,74 He continued: 
[A] judicial construction of the due process clause that will 
sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the 
promulgation of the order itself .... A military commander may 
overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But 
if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the 
doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative power of its 
own, and all that it creates will be in its own image. 75 
Professor Dean Hashimoto has observed that the "complicated issue 
in Korematsu involves deciding what amount of deference, if any, should 
be accorded by the Court to government authorities in times of perceived 
emergency.,,76 He continued to note that the "central lesson we learn from 
Korematsu appears to be that there is an important role for judicial review 
72. [d. at 223-24. 
73. [d. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
74. [d. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
75. [d. at 245-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
76. Dean M. Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States: A Dangerous 
Narrative Retold, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72,120 (1996). 
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of substantive decisions by military authorities" and that "the Court should 
recognize that Korematsu stands for the principle of judicial abstention.'>77 
However, the factual support upon which the Korematsu Court relied 
for its upholding of the military order was "the finding of the military 
authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation 
of the disloyal from the loyal.,,78 The Court's sole basis of empirical 
evidence for the military's assertion of disloyalty were the answers on a 
questionnaire given to Japanese American internees seventeen years of age 
or 01der.79 The Court concluded that answers to this questionnaire 
confirmed "[t]hat there were members of the [Japanese American 
community] who retained loyalties to Japan.',80 However, as Professor 
Hashimoto has pointed out: 
On closer analysis, the statistical evidence was extremely weak 
for what the Court wanted to prove. The Court relied upon a 
questionnaire administered approximately a year after the 
incarceration began. Thus, military authorities did not rely on this 
evidence when they decided to impose the exclusion order. 
Furthermore, the questionnaire was hardly a valid means of 
determining risk of espionage or subversive activity. Many 
refused to swear unqualified allegiance to protest the conditions 
of the internment camps or to avoid military service.81 
77. Id. at 124-25. 
78. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219. 
79. See Iijima, supra note 32, at 403 n.60 (citing WEGLYN, supra note 32, at 136-40). 
Weglyn stated: 
[T]he "Loyalty Oath" consisted of two identical questions in two different 
forms-{)ne for draft age Nisei, the "Statement of United States Citizenship of 
Japanese Ancestry," and the other for Issei and female Nisei, "Application for 
Leave Clearance." They were as follows: 
No. 27. Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on 
combat duty, wherever ordered? 
No. 28. Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of 
America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by 
foreign and domestic forces, and foreswear any form of allegiance or 
obedience to the Japanese emperor, to any other foreign government, power 
or organization? 
WEGL YN, supra note 32, at 136-40. 
80. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219 (observing that "five thousand American citizens of 
Japanese ancestry refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and to 
renounce allegiance to the Japanese Emperor, and several thousand evacuees requested 
repatriation to Japan."). 
81. Hashimoto, supra note 76, at 108. 
The Loyalty Oath questions permitted only "yes" or "no" answers. However, 
irrespective of their political views, the fact remained that "yes" answers to the 
loyalty questions for the Issei, who were not citizens of the United States, left 
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III. THE RACIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF KOREMATSU 
In fact, the government lied to the Korematsu Court about the 
necessity of incarcerating Japanese Americans.82 Professor Eric 
Yamamoto, almost two decades ago, published a piece in which he 
explored the implications of Korematsu,83 not solely from the perspective 
of the racism at its core, but from the equally disturbing stance it took with 
respect to the standard of judicial review of government actions taken in 
the name of national security.84 He wrote that the application of "a 
deferential standard of review to the information proffered by the 
government, the Hirabayashi v. United States and Korematsu Courts in 
essence validated the curfew and evacuation on faith ... [and] that faith 
was badly misplaced.,,85 
On April 19, 1984, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel, United States District 
Judge for the Northern District of California, granted Fred Korematsu's 
writ of coram nobis vacating his original conviction for violating the 
military exclusion order over forty years earlier.86 What was particularly 
extraordinary was the basis upon which the writ was granted; during the 
period the propriety and constitutionality of Japanese American internment 
was examined and decided, there was "critical contradictory evidence 
known to the government and knowingly concealed from the courts" 
related to the "critical question of military necessity.,,87 
Professor Yamamoto carefully catalogued the instances of 
them with the possibility of becoming people with no country. Some felt that a 
"yes" answer could have been a trap to identify Japan sympathizers since it could 
be interpreted as an admission of prior allegiance to Japan. A "no" answer to 
question 27... could reflect less on disloyalty than a repugnance for 
incarceration .... Many wondered whether the "yes-yes" responders were going 
to be "rewarded" by being drafted, while the "no-no" responders were to be 
"rewarded" with continued incarceration or worse. 
Iijima, supra note 32, at 403-04 (citing ROGER DANIELS, PRISONERS WITHOUT TRIAL: 
JAPANESE AMERICANS IN WORLD WAR II 69 (Eric Foner ed., 1993); WEOL YN, supra note 32, 
at 136-38». Moreover, the oath "was administered to a population that had just been 
uprooted, terrorized, and unjustly incarcerated." Id. at 403 n.6\. 
82. E.g., Bert Eljera, Once a Fugitive, Now a Hero, ASIAN WEEK, Jan. 15, 1998, 
http://www.asianweek.comlOI1598/coverstory.html; Kaleena Seidlinger, Profs Assess Self 
Inflicted Dangers to America, DAKOTA STUDENT ONLINE, Nov. 1, 2001, at 
http://www.und.edulorglds/_issues/200 1/11 102/newsldangers.html. 
83. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Korematsu, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of 
Fred Korematsu for his refusal to obey the military's wartime exclusion orders. Id. at 219. 
84. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited, supra note 50. 
85. Id. at 9. In Hirabayashi v. United States, the Supreme Court sustained a conviction 
for the violation of a curfew imposed upon Japanese Americans. 320 U.S. 81, 83, 105 
(1943), ajJ'dinpart, rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 591 (9th CiT. 1987). 
86. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406,1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
87. Id. at 1417. 
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government misrepresentation and concealment related to the internment 
cases and cited by Judge Patel in her coram nobis decision.88 This 
governmental misconduct included: (l) the deliberate alteration and 
concealment from the courts of explicitly racist conclusions in the 
military's justification for Japanese American evacuation;89 (2) the failure 
to disclose American intelligence reports, which concluded that Japanese 
Americans as a group did not represent a security threat and that directly 
contradicted the military's justification for internment;90 (3) the 
concealment of intelligence reports that recommended the handling of 
potential disloyalty on an individual basis;91 (4) the failure to present 
findings by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the necessity for 
Japanese American evacuation was based "primarily on public and political 
pressure;,,92 and (5) the failure to advise of the absence of any verified act 
of espionage or sabotage by Japanese Americans.93 Thus, Professor 
Yamamoto concluded that: 
[The] lesson of Korematsu is that grave social injustice is possible 
in America during times of national frustration and fear if the 
government. . . is not held closely accountable to constitutional 
standards by courts. Despite this lesson and Justice Jackson's 
"loaded weapon" warning, Korematsu 's principle of diminished 
government accountability lingers.94 
Yamamoto contended although many view Korematsu as articulating 
"a strict standard of review, while according almost total deference to the 
military's unsubstantiated assertion of 'necessity' or as applying a rational 
basis standard of review," its true legal legacy is one that lacks 
governmental accountability with respect to the Japanese American 
exclusion orders.95 
This lack of governmental accountability is even more critical in 
circumstances where race plays an important role.96 Indeed, the racial 
88. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited, supra note 50, at 9-17. 
89. [d. at 10-12, 16. 
90. [d. at 12-14, 16. 
91. [d. at 14, 16. 
92. [d. at 15-16. 
93. [d. In particular, on February 14, 1942, General John Dewitt, Military Commander 
of the Western Defense Command, submitted a recommendation to the Secretary of War 
recommending a mass evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from certain areas on 
the West Coast. [d. at 8 n.24. Several days later, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued 
Executive Order 9066, which authorized the military to effectuate the evacuation and 
internment of Japanese Americans. !d. 
94. [d. at 30-31 (citations omitted). 
95. Id.at31 n.115. 
96. See id. 
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underpinnings of Korematsu are even more evident in the Hirabayashi 
companion case.97 In Hirabayashi, Justice Stone, writing for the majority, 
concluded that since "social, economic and political conditions" had 
worked to prevent Japanese assimilation into the white population, it "may 
well have tended to increase... their attachments to Japan and its 
institutions.,,98 This kind of racial-logic undergirding the internment cases 
has led one scholar to remark that the cases 
[A ]re not examples of strict judicial oversight at all, but of the 
opposite practice: judicial deference to the executive branch, 
specifically the military... [that] not only gives too much 
unchecked power to the Executive, but also reinforces racial 
myths by using them as tools oflegal reasoning.99 
IV. THE RACIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF HAMDI 
Given the historical record of government misrepresentation in 
national security matters, the result in Hamdi is greatly troubling. 
Moreover, like Korematsu, Hamdi cannot be separated from its own racial 
underpinnings. 100 Since the result in Hamdi was individualized,lol the 
Fourth Circuit did not feel constrained to rationalize its result as being free 
from racial considerations as did the Korematsu Court. 102 However, the 
post-September 11 racial environment lies at the heart of the decision 
because the Hamdi decision both reflects and exacerbates the racial 
construction of the terrorist "Other," and, in a real sense, relies upon that 
construction to blunt the effect of stripping an American citizen of his 
rights. 103 Similar to the racial atmosphere surrounding Korematsu's 
justification of its separation of Japanese Americans from "real" 
Americans, the "deAmericanizing" process of Arabs and Muslims was 
central to the rationalization of Hamdi's treatment as well. 104 
In fact, recent draft legislation authored by the Bush administration 
has as one of its provisions the ability of the government to strip the actual 
citizenship of any American who supports the activities of organizations 
97. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 96, 98 (upholding military curfew for Japanese 
Americans). 
98. [d. 
99. Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the 
Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. I, 24-
25 (2002). 
100. See Hamdi III, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2002). 
101. See Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 475. 
102. [d.; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
103. See Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 471-74. 
104. See id.; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
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that the government deems to be "terrorist.,,105 It has been speculated that 
this proposed legislation may be to counter criticism of the manner in 
which the government has treated Yaser Hamdi and others who are 
American citizens. 106 The draft legislation also explicitly reinforces the 
notion of constructing American identity in opposition to the foreign 
"Other" and reifies it into law itself. 107 Professor Leti Volpp expresses this 
notion succinctly: 
In the American imagination, those who appear "Middle 
Eastern, Arab, or Muslim" may be theoretically entitled to formal 
rights, but they do not stand in for or represent the nation .... 
The consolidation of American identity takes place against 
them .... Thus, one may formally be a U.S. citizen and formally 
entitled to various legal guarantees, but one will stand outside of 
the membership of kinship/solidarity that structures the U.S. 
nation. And clearly, falling outside the identity of the "citizen" 
can reduce the ability to exercise citizenship as a political or legal 
matter. Thus, the general failure to identify people who appear 
"Middle Eastern, Arab or Muslim" as constituting American 
national identity reappears to haunt their ability to enjoy 
citizenship as a matter of rights .... ,,108 
105. E.g., Joanne Mariner, Patriot II's Attack on Citizenship, FINDLAW'S LEGAL 
COMMENTARY, Mar. 3, 2003, at http://writ.findlaw.com/mariner/20030303.html. Mariner 
stated "[s]ection 501 of the bill [the Domestic Security Enhancement Act, informally known 
as "Patriot II"], deceptively titled "Expatriation of Terrorists," would provide for the 
presumptive denationalization of American citizens who support the activities of any 
organization that the executive branch has deemed 'terrorist.'" Id. Indeed, the act 
denationalization provisions would extend to support of even the legal activities of such an 
organization. !d. 
106. Id. "Patriot II" would also expand the reach of the original USA Patriot Act by 
allowing the government even more surveillance powers, curtailing the right to sue for 
constitutional violations, strengthening the government's ability to detain secretly, among 
other provisions. Anita Ramasastry, Patriot 11: The Sequel Why It's Even Scarier than the 
First Patriot Act, FINDLAW'S LEGAL COMMENTARY, Feb.17, 2003, at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20030217.html. 
107. Mariner, supra note 105. 
108. Leti Volpp, Critical Race Studies: The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 1575, 1594-95 (2002) (emphasis added). Yamamoto and Serrano also point out that 
although President Bush rhetorically distanced himself from the racial profiling of Muslims 
and Arabs: 
[T]he government actions potentially raised the ugly specter of guilt-by-
association ("if you're not with us, you're against us"). This principle, for some, 
was a coded reference to ancestry, casting suspicion on all persons of Arab 
descent. Indeed the FBI and INS reportedly commenced racial profiling 
investigations and detentions .... 
Yamamoto & Serrano, supra note 18, at 54 .. 
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Gil Gott has described the Japanese American internment as a "key 
discursive event," which "helped reestablish racial unity of the national 
self.,,109 This is echoed in the recent increasing "racialization" of the 
terrorist "enemy." 
Professor Natsu Saito, even before the attacks on September 11 
occurred, prophetically warned of the way in which Arab Americans were 
being "'raced' as 'terrorists. ",liD Professor Saito observed that there was a 
possibility of the internment of Arab Americans because, similar to Asian 
Americans, Arab Americans had been stereotyped in the larger culture as 
"foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening." I I I 
Professor Volpp has incisively explored the racial profiling of Arabs 
and Muslims since September 11. 112 Indeed, she asserts that there is a 
public consensus that racial profiling is even a good thing with respect to 
national security. 113 She has articulated the ways in which these groups 
have been racially targeted and how that targeting has been legitimatized: 
(1) the sweep of 1200 noncitizens-primarily from Arab or Muslim 
countries-for "investigation" to prevent terrorist attacks, although no one 
detained has been identified as engaged in terrorist activity; 114 (2) the 
conducting of more than five thousand investigatory interviews of male 
non-citizens from Middle Eastern or Islamic countries on non-immigrant 
visas; 115 (3) the selective enforcement of removal for those non-citizens 
from countries with "AI Qaeda terrorist presence"; 116 (4) airline and airport 
racial profiling of passengers who appear Middle Eastern or Arab; 117 (5) 
109. Gott, supra note 18, at 269. 
110. Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the 
"Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists," 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 12 (2001). 
111. !d. 
112. Volpp, supra note 108, at 1576-86. 
113. Id. at 1576-77 ("There was a strong belief [pre-9111] that racial profiling was 
inefficient, ineffective, and unfair. This all seems a distant memory. There is now public 
consensus that racial profiling is a good thing, and in fact necessary for survival." (citations 
omitted». 
114. Id. at 1577-78. Professor Volpp notes, "[w]e in fact do not know the cumulative 
total of persons that have been put in detention, because the government has refused to 
release this figure to the public since November 2001." Id. at 1577 n.6. 
115. Id. at 1578. 
116. Id. at 1579. In December of 2002, two thousand Iranian Americans demonstrated 
in Los Angeles to protest the arrests of Middle Eastern immigrants who had voluntarily 
registered with the INS. Iranian Americans Protest Immigration Policy, CNN.COM, Dec. 19, 
2002, at http://www.cnn.coml2002IUSlWestlI2/18/ins.protest. The FBI is engaged in a 
project of surveilling hundreds of Muslim men in the United States, including twenty-four 
hour taps on their telephone calls, e-mail messages, and internet use. Philip Shenon & David 
Johnston, Seeking Terrorist Plots. F.B.I. is Tracking Hundreds of Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
6,2002, at AI. 
117. Volpp, supra note 108, at 1580. 
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anti-Arab violence and hate crimes that are rationalized not as hate crimes, 
but crimes of passion or as a misdirected sense ofpatriotism. 118 
The ideological result of this profiling "is the legitimation of the 
religious and modem imperative to eradicate ... the forces of despotism, 
terror, primitivism and fundamentalism, each of which are coded as Middle 
Eastern, Arab, and Muslim.,,119 As such, the relationship of this 
contemporary racial environment to the racial logic in Korematsu is more 
clear. 120 Group identification and determinism are the ways in which 
nonwhites, specifically in the contemporary context, Arabs, Muslims, 
South Asians, and Middle Easterners, are to be evaluated as distinct from 
the way in which whites are viewed as autonomous individuals. 121 Thus, 
Professor Volpp concludes that, similar to Japanese Americans during 
World War II, the fungibility of members of a racially defined group makes 
it impossible to screen our individual loyal citizens from enemy aliens. 122 
Professor Leonard Baynes has recently documented precisely what 
Professor Volpp has theorized. 123 He compared the media coverage of 
Charles Bishop, a teenager who flew a small plane into an office building 
in Tampa, Florida and left a note expressing support for Osama bin Laden, 
and John Walker Lindh, captured by American soldiers in Afghanistan 
while serving as a soldier for the Taliban. 124 He concluded that "the 
coverage of each perpetrator changed over time to mirror changing 
perceptions of each man's 'racialized identity.'" 125 
Professor Baynes observed that the coverage of Charles Bishop, who 
was first thought to be white, centered around a "what went wrong with his 
upbringing?" approach until it was discovered that he was one-half 
118. Id. at 1589-90. 
119. Id. at 1582. 
120. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222-23. 
121. Volpp, supra note 108, at 1583-85. Professor Volpp writes: 
Under the logic of profiling all people who look like terrorists under the "Middle 
Eastern" stereotype, all whites should have been subjected to stops, detentions, 
and searches after the Oklahoma City bombing and the identification of 
[Timothy] McVeigh as the prime suspect. This did not happen because Timothy 
McVeigh did not produce a discourse about good whites and bad whites, because 
we think of him as an individual deviant, a bad actor. We do not think of his 
actions as representative of an entire racial group. This is part and parcel of how 
racial subordination functions, to understand nonwhites as directed by group-
based determinism but whites as individuals. 
Id. at 1584-85 (citations omitted). 
122. Id. at 1591. 
123. Baynes, supra note 59, at 40-46. 
124. /d. 
125. Id. at 62. 
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Syrian.126 At that point, Professor Baynes noted that his coverage became 
less favorable, and that "the news media speculated that [his] ethnicity 
might have had something to do with his behavior.,,127 In contrast, Baynes 
points out that John Walker Lindh was first shown in a photograph with 
"long dark hair, a beard, and a face darkened by dirt.,,128 "[H]is darkened 
features made him appear to be something other than a white American.,,129 
However, once the media began to make it clear he was a white member of 
Generation X, the coverage became more favorable. 130 News stories began 
appearing comparing him to children of average Americans. 131 
Thus, the same kind of racial reasoning underlies the judicial 
deference in both the cases of Korematsu and Hamdi. 132 In the former, the 
assumption of group disloyalty was explicit, in the latter the assumption 
forms the backdrop to and the implicit justification for a draconian decision 
and result: 133 
[T]he "Arab" racial construct has rapidly taken center stage in the 
wake of September 11 .... [T]he fact that racial assumptions are 
accepted as "common sense" does not mean that they underlie 
126. /d. at 45. 
127. Id. at 41. 
128. /d. at 45. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. Indeed, Professor Baynes noted that the media coverage of Walker Lindh's 
eventual plea agreement was relatively light in comparison to other newsworthy and 
controversial criminal proceedings such as the 0.1. Simpson verdict.Id. at 46 n.28 I. 
132. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24; Hamdi llI, 316 F.3d at 475-76. It is worthwhile to 
note the recent sentiment that has attempted to "sanitize" the Japanese American internment. 
Associated Press, N.c. Rep.: WWll Internment Camps Were Meant to Help, 
FOXNEWS.COM, Feb. 5, 2003, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0.2933.77677.00.html. 
Representative Howard Coble, R-N.C., the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, stated on a radio program in 
response to a caller's suggestion that Arabs be interned, that the internment camps were 
established to "protect" Japanese Americans. Id. He added that "[s]ome [Japanese 
Americans] probably were intent on doing harm to us just as some of these Arab-Americans 
are probably intent on doing harm to us." /d. 
Indeed, it has been noted that even Chief Justice William Rehnquist has been muted in 
his criticism of the internment. Yen, supra note 50, at 2-3 (reviewing Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's essay When the Laws Were Silent, see William H. Rehnquist, When the Laws 
Were Silent, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1998, at 77-89). 
133. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-19; Hamdi Ill, 316 F.3d at 475-76; see also Joo, 
supra note 99, at 31 : 
It is common to describe discrimination and racial profiling as panicked 
responses to perceived crises, or as specific individuals' acts of malice. But such 
arguments wrongly make this kind of injustice seem like anomalous, random 
events that are unforeseeable and unpreventable. In fact, they are expressions of 
commonly held and unquestioned racial ideology. 
Joo, supra note 99, at 31. 
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every government decision that affects people of color. But it 
does mean that they often escape notice .... Race and executive 
power are closely intertwined in the current national security 
crisis, as they have been in past crises, real and perceived. 
Excessive deference to the Executive may legitimate racial 
reasoning, and racial reasoning may legitimate expansion of 
executive power. 134 
133 
The racial subtext of the Hamdi decisions is highly reminiscent of the 
subtext at play in the government's prosecution and persecution of Dr. Wen 
Ho Lee. 135 Describing all-too-familiar allegations, Helen Zia has written: 
FBI agents had to persuade a federal judge to imprison Dr. Lee 
because he was so dangerous, so inscrutable, such a threat to 
national security he should be locked up, pretrial. Their arguments 
were so chilling that Dr. Lee was held in solitary confinement and 
maximum security, complete with shackles and chains. The FBI 
argued that Dr. Lee's mere "hello" might contain a secret message 
for agents from China-messages that could result in the 
production of an advanced nuclear warhead. 136 
As has been pointed out by many scholars, the racial subtext of the 
Lee case-echoing the racial assumptions about Japanese Americans 
underlying their internment-was the underlying assumption that as a 
person of Chinese descent, Dr. Lee's loyalty was automatically suspect. 137 
It is that kind of prevalent assumption about people of color that lends 
additional resonance and salience to its similarity to the Hamdi case. 138 But 
134. Joo, supra note 99, at 46-47. 
135. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION, supra note 10, at 472. Dr. 
Lee, a Los Alamos nuclear scientist, was a naturalized American citizen for twenty-five 
years when it was revealed that he had been the target of a four-year federal espionage 
investigation. Id. at 464-74. He was charged with fifty-nine counts of downloading secret 
infonnation. Id. 
136. Helen Zia, Oh, Say, Can You See?: Post September 11, 27/28 AMERASIA J. 2, 9 
(2001-2002). It should be pointed out how similar the government's representations about 
Dr. Lee's alleged ability to convey "secret codes" are to their representations about Jose 
Padilla's potential to contact al Qaeda terrorists through counsel. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. 
Supp. 2d 564, 603-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Padilla I]; see infra text accompanying 
notes 156-158. 
137. For an exploration of the Wen Ho Lee case and its racial underpinnings, see, e.g., 
YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION, supra note 10, at 464-74; Joo, supra 
note 99, at 7-14. 
138. Hamdi Ill, 316 F.3d at 475-76. It should be pointed out here that I am drawing no 
conclusions about the guilt or innocence of Mr. Hamdi, nor am I attempting to equate the 
situation or culpability of Dr. Lee or Fred Korematsu to that of Mr. Hamdi. My sole purpose 
is to illustrate how unstated racist assumptions have express manifestations in judicial 
results and the dangers of abandoning any judicial oversight of the government's 
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of even greater relevance to the Hamdi case is the fact that the 
government's case against Dr. Lee and its assertions of his threat to 
national security began to unravel at the point where the truth of the 
government's allegation was tested. 139 It became apparent: (1) that the 
government had suppressed internal documents indicating that Dr. Lee was 
not guilty of espionage; (2) that key FBI investigators acknowledged that 
facts had been misstated to the court; (3) that Dr. Lee's FBI lie detector test 
in which he had denied any espionage activity had indicated a high degree 
of honesty; (4) that ninety-nine percent of the information that Dr. Lee had 
downloaded was already in the public domain; and (5) that the government 
had engaged in explicit racial profiling in their targeting of Dr. Lee. 140 
Thus, the lesson for the Hamdi court is clear: 
While the Hamdi court pays lip service to "meaningful judicial 
review" and confines its precise holding to seizures taking place 
in combat zones abroad, its decision ignores the broader teachings 
of Anglo-American history from 1627 through the prosecution of 
Dr. Wen Ho Lee-in which executive allegations of devastating 
threats to national security collapsed when subjected to adversary 
testing before an independent judiciary. 141 
V. PADILLA V. BUSH: WHEN IN A WORLD OF NOTHING A PITTANCE CAN 
ApPEAR As PLENTY 
The Fourth Circuit's deference is also troubling in the context of 
another equally troubling post 9/11 case involving another American 
citizen and alleged terrorist, Jose Padilla. 142 Mr. Padilla, born in Brooklyn, 
New York, was the subject of sensational reports alleging that he was a 
member of the al Qaeda terrorist network who was involved in a plot to 
detonate a radioactive "dirty bomb" in the United States. 143 After a flurry 
allegations. 
139. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION, supra note 10, at 473. 
140. [d. Dr. Lee pled guilty to one count of unauthorized possession of national 
defense material. [d. At his plea hearing, the district court judge apologized to Dr. Lee "for 
the unfair manner in which you were held in custody by the executive branch." [d. at 474. 
141. Eric M. Freedman, Lest We Forget: Hamdi and the Case of the Five Knights, 
LEGAL TIMES, Feb.3, 2002, at 60. 
142. Padilla I, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
143. [d. at 569-572; Dan Eggen & Susan Schmidt, 'Dirty Bomb' Plot Uncovered, u.s. 
Says: Suspected al Qaeda Operative Held as 'Enemy Combatant', WASH. POST, June 11, 
2002, at AI. Padilla was reported to have converted to Islam and changed his name to 
Abdullah al Muhajir. [d. A "dirty bomb" is a device combining radioactive material and 
conventional explosive. [d. 
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of government announcements linking Padilla to various al Qaeda terrorist 
plots, it became increasingly clear that Padilla was not, in fact, closely 
connected to al Qaeda. l44 Moreover, according to reports of U.S. 
intelligence officials, the plot was "blown out of proportion." 145 
Padilla was arrested in May of 2002, on a material witness warrant to 
secure his testimony before a grand jury investigation into the September 
11 attacks. 146 On June 9, 2002, the government disclosed that the President 
had designated Padilla as an "enemy combatant.,,147 
Despite the fact that the circumstances surrounding his detention were 
even more attenuated than Mr. Hamdi's, and despite the fact that he was 
nowhere near any combat in Afghanistan, he was nevertheless detained 
without formal charges and without the prospect of release from a naval 
brig in South Carolina. 148 In addition, it was undisputed that he was held 
incommunicado and had not been permitted to confer with counsel. I49 
Padilla petitioned for habeas corpus relief, challenging both the lawfulness 
of his detention as well as an order prohibiting him from consulting with 
counsel. 150 
Significantly, attached to the Presidential Order classifying Padilla as 
an "enemy combatant" was also a declaration by Michael Mobbs (the 
Mobbs Declaration), which set forth a version of facts "as the basis for the 
conclusions set forth in the June 9 Order.,,151 Similar to their position in 
Hamdi, the government argued that the Mobbs Declaration was sufficient 
to establish the correctness of the Presidential findings, which led to 
Padilla's "enemy combatant" designation. 152 United States District Court 
144. Christopher Newton, Officials Downplay Terror Suspect, AP ONLINE, Aug. 13, 
2002, available at 2002 WL 25139054. 
145. Michael Isikoff, And Justice for All: John Ashcroft Crowed of the Arrest of 
Alleged 'Dirty Bomber' Jose Padilla. But Do the Feds Have a Case? NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19, 
2002, at 32. 
146. Padilla [, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 569. 
147. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. Id. at 574. 
150. [d. at 569. 
151. [d. at 572. 
152. !d. The Mobbs Declaration stated in pertinent part that Padilla was born in New 
York and convicted of various crimes including murder and weapons charges; that he 
moved to Egypt and took the name Abdullah al Muhajir; that in 2001 while in Afghanistan 
he had contacted senior al Qaeda officials and had proposed stealing radioactive material 
and detonating a "radiological dispersal device" within the United States; that he had done 
research for such a project and discussed others with different al Qaeda officials at various 
locations in Pakistan. [d. at 572-73. In addition, the government submitted under seal 
another unredacted version of information related to the President's designation (the "Sealed 
Mobb's Declaration"). [d. at 572. 
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Judge Michael Mukasey held that the President had the authority to 
designate as an enemy combatant an American citizen captured on 
American soil. 153 However, he continued by stating that: 
Although Padilla has the ability, through his lawyer, to challenge 
the government's naked legal right to hold him as an unlawful 
combatant on any set of facts whatsoever, he has no ability to 
make fact-based arguments because, as is not disputed, he has 
been held incommunicado during his confinement ... and has not 
been permitted to consult with counsel. Therefore, unless I find 
that the only fact issue Padilla has a right to be heard on is 
whether the government's proffered facts, taken alone and 
without right of response, are sufficient to warrant his detention 
by whatever evidentiary standard may apply-an argument that 
can be presented by counsel without access to Padilla-I must 
address the question of whether he may present facts, and how he 
may do SO.154 
Judge Mukasey found that Congress had plainly intended that a habeas 
corpus petitioner would be able to place facts and issues of fact before a 
court and that refusing to allow Padilla to do so "would frustrate the 
purpose of the remedy.,,155 
The government in opposition argued that affording Padilla access to 
counsel would interfere with his questioning and contended that access to 
counsel would be dangerous because "al Qaeda operatives are trained to 
use third parties as intermediaries to pass messages to fellow 
terrorists .... ,,156 
The court disagreed with the government's first contention because it 
believed any interference with the questioning of Padilla by the access to 
counsel for the limited purposes related to the habeas corpus petition would 
be "minimal or nonexistent.,,157 Perhaps more telling was the court's view 
that the government's conjecture that Padilla could use his counsel to pass 
facts on to al Qaeda operatives based upon the allegations contained in the 
Mobbs Declaration was "gossamer speculation.,,158 
However, rather than subjecting the government to a meaningful 
review as District Court Judge Doumar had done in Hamdi, Judge Mukasey 
continued by outlining the evidentiary standard by which he would 
153. Id. at 588-89. 
154. Id. at 599. 
155. /d. at 600. 
156. Id. at 603. 
157. /d. 
158. Id. at 604. 
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determine whether the facts presented by the government in support of its 
"enemy combatant" designation were sufficient. 159 He began by noting that 
"it would be a mistake to create the impression that there is a lush and 
vibrant jurisprudence governing these matters. There isn't. Ex parte Quirin 
offers no guidance regarding the standard to be applied in making the 
threshold determination that a habeas corpus petitioner is an unlawful 
combatant." 160 
The court concluded by stating that it would examine only 
[W]hether there is some evidence to support [the President's] 
conclusion that Padilla was ... engaged in a mission against the 
United States on behalf of an enemy with whom the United States 
is at war, and ... whether that evidence has not been entirely 
mooted by subsequent events. 161 
While the "some evidence" standard is facially more than the "no 
evidence" standard applied by the Fourth Circuit, it is important to note that 
this evidentiary standard is being applied to a citizen who is facing 
incarceration for an indefinite period as an "enemy combatant.,,162 Thus, 
the "some evidence" standard is still lower than even the burden to prevail 
in a civil lawsuit and certainly much lower than the burden in a criminal 
case. 163 Moreover, with such a low threshold it is unlikely that a 
government "enemy combatant" designation could ever be effectively 
challenged. 164 
159. Id. at 605-10. 
160. Id. at 607 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,19 (1942». 
161. /d. at 608. In a subsequent ruling upon a government motion to reconsider his 
ruling in Padilla 1, Judge Mukasey again rejected the government's contention that doing so 
would hinder anti-terrorism efforts. Padilla ex rei. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 
42,43 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter Padilla I/]. 
162. See Hamdi III, 316 F.3d 450, 473-74 (4th Cir. 2003). 
163. DOHERTY ET AL., IMBALANCE OF POWERS, supra note 27, at 65. Judge Mukasey 
articulated the "some evidence" standard as "the opportunity to present evidence that 
undermines the reliability of the Mobbs Declaration." Padilla 11,243 F. Supp. 2d at 56. 
164. On December 18, 2003, shortly before this piece was going to press, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that absent express congressional authorization, "the President 
does not have the power under Article II of the Constitution to detain as an enemy 
combatant an American citizen seized on American soil outside a zone of combat." Padilla 
v. Rumsfeld, Docket Nos. 03-2235 (L), 03-24-38 (Con.); 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25616, at 
*5 (2d Cir. Dec. 18,2003). In essence, using the framework set out in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Salryer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), for analyzing the legitimacy of an exercise of 
Executive power, the Second Circuit concluded that the President did not have "clear 
congressional authorization" pursuant to the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000) 
and that Congress's Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No. 
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (hereinafter "Joint Resolution") passed after the September 
11 th attacks to take such action. Id. at *6. It is instructional and important to note that the 
court expressly avoided addressing the issue of the detention of an American citizen seized 
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within a zone of combat such as in the case ofYsar Hamdi. Id. at *7. 
As to the substantive issue of Padilla's detention as an "enemy combatant," the Second 
Circuit found that the President lacked inherent constitutional authority to detain American 
citizens on American soil outside a zone of combat. Citing Congressional power to define 
and punish offenses against the law of nations (the "Offenses Clause"), the power to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus (the "Suspension Clause") and the Third Amendment 
(allowing congressional authority to quarter of troops in private homes time of war), the 
Second Circuit declared that the Constitution lodges the power to effect "significant 
domestic abridgements of individual liberties" to the Congress, not to the Executive, during 
national emergencies. Id. at *55-56. Thus, the court concluded that "while Congress -
otherwise acting consistently with the Constitution - may have the power to authorize the 
detention of United States citizens under the circumstances of Padilla's case, the President, 
acting alone, does not." Id. at *57. 
Moreover, the Second Circuit quickly distinguished Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) 
which the government had used to argue that the President had such inherent authority. 
First, the court stated that the "Quirin Court's decision to uphold military jurisdiction rested 
on express congressional authorization" and was silent as to whether the President had the 
power to impose such tribunals absent congressional approval. Id. at *59. Moreover, the 
petitioners in Quirin had admitted that they were soldiers in the armed forces of a nation at 
war against the United States, a fact clearly in dispute in Padilla's case. Id. at *61. But 
perhaps most importantly, QUirin was decided in 1942 before the Non-Detention Act was 
promulgated. Id. at *60. The Non-Detention Act provided in relevant part that "No citizen 
of shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act 
by Congress." 18 U.S .. C. § 4001(a) (2000). It is significant that the Second Circuit 
specifically pointed to the legislative history of the act in which references were made to the 
detention of Japanese American citizens during World War II (both detentions, incidentally, 
the court noted were authorized by both the Executive as well as the Congress). Id. at *68. 
Thus, military detentions were to be covered under the act. Id. Yet, citing a Japanese 
internment case in which the Supreme Court granted habeas corpus relief to a Japanese 
American internee, Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298-300 (1944), it held that the Joint 
Resolution did not authorize the detention of American citizens which the Endo Court had 
expressly directed had to be done by clear and unmistakable language within the grant of 
powers to restrain citizens. Id. at *80. For an insightful discussion of the Endo case, in 
terms of both the narrowness of its holding as well as its timing coming one day after the 
War Department announced the release of Japanese internees, see YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, 
RIGHTS, AND REPARATIONS, supra note 10, at 173-175. In conclusion, absent any further 
authorization from Congress giving the President additional authority, the Second Circuit 
directed the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus to release Padilla within 30 days, 
after which time the government could transfer him to civilian authorities for appropriate 
action. Id. at *84. 
What perhaps is most ironic in this careful and thoughtful opinion by the Second Circuit 
is the striking manner in which the focus remained on the power and inherent authority of 
the Executive and Congress in times of national emergency. However, it still leaves 
completely unaddressed the underlying dangers of that authority when utilized by a 
unprincipled government fueled by popular, but dangerous, national sentiment. It bears 
noting that at least in terms of Japanese American internment, the issue of whether there was 
"legitimate" authority to imprison the entire community to this day has never been officially 
repudiated by the Supreme Court. Indeed, the Japanese American experience illustrates 
vividly that justice cannot solely lie in the "legitimate" exercise of power-as important as 
that may be-it must also lie in moral and political courage and integrity in times of national 
stress. Here, as in Mr. Hamdi's case, the government's bare assertion of Mr. Padilla's 
culpability, historically and repeatedly suspect in so many other instances, still goes 
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INTERLUDE 
I have always been uncomfortable with one of the standard arguments 
made against Japanese American internment. I have heard it often said 
that the internment was unjustified because there was never any evidence 
of any Japanese American sabotage or espionage. I always cringe when 
anyone says this because, of course, this argument implicitly endorses the 
notion that the internment of the Japanese community would have been less 
racist if there were Japanese American individuals who had committed 
such actions. 
Similarly, I have always felt vaguely uncomfortable saying that we 
must never let something like the Japanese American internment happen 
again because there was something implicit about American justice in that 
statement as well, but I just could not articulate it. 
Recently, Natsu Saito said something at a conference that crystallized 
it for me. 165 She talked about how the historical suppression of American 
progressive movements and the subordination of people of color have 
always been about the maintenance of a race and class status quo. 166 She 
unchallenged. Indeed, the final words of Judge Wesley's dissent bear repeating at length: 
Sadly, the majority's resolution of this matter fails to address the real weakness 
of the government's appeal. Padilla presses to have his day in court to rebut the 
government's factual assertions that he falls within the authority of the Joint 
Resolution. The government contends that Mr. Padilla can be held 
incommunicado for 18 months with no serious opportunity to put the government 
to its proof by an appropriate standard. The government fears that to do otherwise 
would compromise its ability both to gather important information from Padilla 
and to prevent him from communicating with other al Qaeda operatives in the 
United States. 
While these concerns may be valid, they cannot withstand the force of another 
clause of the Constitution on which all three of us could surely agree. No one has 
suspended the Great Writ .... 
Mr. Padilla's case reveals the unique dynamics of our constitutional 
government. Padilla is alleged to be a member of an organization that most 
Americans view with anger and distrust. Yet his legal claims receive careful and 
thoughtful attention and are examined not in the light of his cause - whatever it 
may be - but by the constitutional and statutory validity of the powers invoked 
against him. 
Id. at *108-10. 
165. Natsu Saito, Law Professor, Georgia State University College of Law, Remarks at 
Takings-Second Joint Conference of the Asian Pacific American Law Faculty 
(CAPALF)/the Western Law Teachers of Color (Mar. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Saito, 
Remarks]; Takings-Second Joint Conference of the Asian Pac,fic American Law Faculty 
(CAPALF)/the Western Law Teachers of Color, at 
http://www.law.seattleu.edultakings/index.asp (last visited Nov. 28, 2003). 
166. Saito, Remarks, supra note 165. 
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pointed out that any threat to that hierarchy was labeled "unAmerican. ,,167 
She reminded us that just as the internment was no aberration, so too was 
the present assault on civil liberties. 168 And it struck me that there have 
always been subtle and not-so-subtle "internments "-starting with the 
incarceration and genocide of the indigenous people at the very inception 
of our nation-before and after the Japanese American one. Some are 
more blatant than others. Some are more pointed than others. But all seek 
to silence and to intimidate. 
VI. MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNAMERICANISM OF PROGRESSIVE CHANGE 
The erosion of civil liberties, of course, is not only marked by the 
explicitly racial results in Korematsu. 169 The erosion of civil liberties is 
also rationalized as a means to preserve a sense of national emergency 
often to disguise another political and social agenda. 170 Mari Matsuda has 
made the cogent observation that: "[j]ust at the moment when overt 
racism. .. was becoming publicly illegitimate, anti-Communism was 
becoming patriotic. McCarthyism' s contradictions were not 
delegitimitizing in the way that white supremacy's contradictions 
were .... ,,171 
Thus, Matsuda concludes that McCarthyism's stripping of the labor 
movement's most effective organizers, the chilling of dissent, "the 
legitimization of greed and [ ] the income gap," the justification for the 
Cold War and the military/industrial complex, "was not a mere by-
product .... It was the goal .... ,,172 Professor Natsu Saito has explained 
the historical attack on civil liberties was motivated "not to ensure the 
security of the general public, but to suppress political movement and 
sectors of the popUlation who are viewed as a threat to the status quO.,,173 
ld. 
The outsider and racial threat explicit in Japanese American 
167. !d. 
168. ld. 
169. 323 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1944). 
170. Gott, supra note 18, at 211. Gott stated: 
Postwar erosions of personal liberties, undertaken in the name of state interest, 
are legion and well known. In a series of Supreme Court cases of the early Cold 
War era, communism-functionally the internal ideological equivalent of the 
external Soviet threat-assumed constitutionally taboo status as the Court began 
authorizing a regime of guilt by association: free speech and association 
restrictions, ideological grounds for deportation, and loyalty oaths were approved 
by the Court. 
171. Matsuda, supra note 7, at 22 (footnote omitted). 
172. ld. at 21. 
173. Saito, Seventh Annual Lateril Conference, supra note 34, at 1060. 
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internment was bounded by the parameters of immediacy, the duration of 
the world war.174 However, it was McCarthyism's anti-communism that 
transformed the external threat into a simultaneous internal and perpetual 
one; one from that the nation constantly and perpetually needed 
protection. 175 Indeed, the "end result of red-baiting replacing race-baiting 
in elite discourse was the elimination of a progressive social agenda with 
economic justice at its core.,,176 
Matsuda brilliantly draws the relationship between McCarthyism' s 
hounding of progressive activists and the internment: 
The justification for their persecution was the danger of a 
monolithic, secret, evil threat of worldwide Communism. Here is 
where McCarthyism links clearly with the internment. It admits of 
no complexity and leaves no room for individual determination. 
There is a group among us, that is not us, that is out to destroy us, 
that must be cabined, contained, and removed. Our very survival 
is at stake, making talk of civil liberties and due process a luxury. 
Let's survive first, then we can start talking about human 
rights. 177 
Indeed, the McCarthyite rhetoric was of external, worldwide threat, and the 
increased need for national security to counteract the evils of 
communism. 178 This was juxtaposed with the necessity to contain domestic 
manifestations of that external threat. 179 This past rhetoric is hauntingly 
familiar today. Even more disturbingly, today's rhetoric is reminiscent both 
of the way that Japanese American internment masked America's racism 
under the rhetoric of national security,180 as well as the way in which 
[d. 
174. Gott, supra note 18, at 201. Gott stated: 
Ironically, of course, the supposed anarchy of the "external" was set loose 
internally, having grown from conditions uniquely domestic and American. 
Again, rhetorically, lawless state action was characterized as necessary in light of 
the external threat, the chaos of the international realm. But an inversion of this 
relationship may better describe the state of events: internal conditions of raw 
racial domination and white supremacy conditioned the state's conduct in its war 
effort. 
175. Matsuda, supra note 7, at 23 ("Public racism and anti-Semitism were replaced 
with public anti-Communism, putting the old fear and hatred in a new, more comfortable 
place .... [E]xplicit racismlanti-Semitisrn largely ceased at the moment when open anti-
Communism became the more effective, post-World War II language of power.") 
176. [d. at 24. 
I 77. [d. at 14. 
178. See Matsuda, supra note 7, at 23-24; Gott, supra note 18, at 201. 
179. See Matsuda, supra note 7, at 23-24; Gott, supra note 18, at 201. 
180. Matsuda, supra note 7, at 21 (''The threat of the outside invader was used to mask 
class interests .... ") 
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McCarthyism masked the hegemony of reactionary political interests such 
that "[t]he social criticism and activist practice required to keep a structural 
analysis of privilege at the forefront became unthinkable .... ,,181 
Moreover, McCarthyism also made potent use of racism in its assault 
against the American people. 182 Indeed, the "foreigner" security threat used 
so powerfully against Japanese Americans during World War nl83 was 
equally effective when used against Chinese Americans after the victory of 
the Communist Party in China. 184 
In 1955, the Second Circuit upheld the convictions of several men of 
Chinese ancestry for violating the Trading with the Enemy Act. 18S The 
"crime" was sending money home to relatives in the then emerging 
People's Republic of China. 186 The prosecution and the eventual 
sentencing of the defendants was meant to send a message to the Chinese 
community about its support for the new China. I 87 
There is a powerful and important film documentary entitled The 
Chinatown Files, which explores the China Daily News case, the 
harassment of progressive Chinese by the FBI, and the general effect of 
McCarthyism on the Chinese American community in the aftermath of the 
Chinese Revolution. 188 From interviews with surviving activists from that 
era, one gains the indelible impression of how McCarthyism spread fear 
throughout the Chinese community.189 The attorney for the defendants in 
the China Daily News case remembers the atmosphere surrounding the 
case: 
181. [d. at 26. During the McCarthy era, on the House of Representatives side, the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) targeted "any organization that 
advocated progressive causes" as a "Communist front" organization. /d. at 20. 
182. See United States v. China Daily News, 224 F.2d 670, 671-72 (2d Cir. 1955). 
183. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223. 
184. See China Daily News, 224 F.2d at 671-72. 
185. [d. 
186. [d. ("The other defendants (stockholder or stockholders and directors of the 
News) sent checks to relatives and acquaintances on the China mainland for the individual 
benefit of the recipients."). 
[d. 
187. [d. at 673. The Second Circuit stated: 
[The trial judge] was ... undoubtedly impressed with the claim of the prosecution 
that this was a planned and extensive siphoning of funds from New York City into 
Communist China, and that strict enforcement of the law was required in order to 
deter the Chinese community in general from further violations of the statute and 
regulations. 
188. THE CHINATOWN FILES (Amy Chen & Ying Chan 2001). For a description of the 
film and its contents, see The Chinatown Files, at http://www.chinatownfiles.org (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2003). 
189. See THE CHINATOWN FILES, supra note 188. 
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They had a press conference before the case began which the 
government agencies claimed, that there was a planned and 
extensive conspiracy to siphon money to the communist 
government in China that involved murder and bribery and all 
kinds of terrible crimes. This was the climate that the government 
created and then admitted in court that there was no such 
thing .... 
Why did they choose these laundrymen [as defendants]? It was 
part of the build up of terrorizing people. Intimidating people, 
they chose these men who were defenseless, had no lawyers, who 
didn't hide what they had done. Who committed no crime as far 
as they're concerned then or as far as I'm concerned then or now. 
Because they could get away with it and it became clear that this 
case was not only intended to demonize these three men because 
they were Chinese,-there's a racist quality in this. But also it 
was intended, I believe, to intimidate the American people. 190 
143 
Indeed, throughout the period, within the Chinese community there was a 
not-so-subtle subtext of potential internment camps for Chinese: '''I heard a 
lot of rumors that they were fixing up the concentration camps for the 
Chinese. My kid brother came in one day and he was really scared. I said 
'what's the matter.' He said, 'I'm going to change my name to Wongamita. 
I'm going to be Japanese.'",191 
The McCarthy era stands out as a particularly repressive time, but the 
activities of the government to suppress dissent and civil liberties were not 
restricted to the McCarthy era alone. 192 For example, during the height of 
the political activity surrounding the Vietnam War, including the rise of 
progressive and even revolutionary consciousness among communities of 
color, the government used concerted programs such as the FBI's 
Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) to disrupt this kind of 
190. Amy Chen & Ying Chan, Transcript of The Chinatown Files 17 (2001) (on file 
with author). 
191. [d. at 13. 
192. Saito, Seventh Annual Latcril Conference, supra note 34, at 1088-98. Natsu Saito 
has comprehensively reviewed the history of how the rhetoric of national security has been 
used to suppress movements for social justice throughout American history: 
[I]n attacking movements for social justice, the government has often justified its 
actions on the ground that these were actually movements for anarchy or 
communism, "alien" ideologies promoted by foreign powers. Not surprisingly, the 
linking of political protest to "sedition" has been most common in attempts to 
suppress antiwar activists. 
[d. at 1067 (citations omitted). 
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"subversive activity.,,193 This governmental activity was so blatantly 
repressive that even a congressional subcommittee, chaired by Senator 
Frank Church, found that these operations were "aimed squarely at 
preventing the exercise of First Amendment rights of speech and 
association .... ,,194 
193. Id. at 1079. For an overview of how the COINTELPRO targeted Communist and 
Socialist organizations, the Civil Rights Movement, the "New Left" and Antiwar 
Movement, the Black Panther Party, and the American Indian Movement among others, see 
id. at 1088-98. 
'''[T]he FBI's COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program) and the CIA's Operation 
Chaos targeted subversive groups for surveillance and dirty tricks'" beginning in the 1970s. 
Roberta Smith, America Tries to Come to Terms With Terrorism: The United Slates Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British Anti-Te"orism Law and 
International Response, 5 CARDOzOJ. INT'L & COMPo L. 249, 259 (1997) (quoting Donna M. 
Schlagheck, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPTS AND ACTORS 
102 (1988»; see also J. Soffiyah Elijah, The Reality of Political Prisoners in the United 
States: What September 11 Taught Us About Defending Them, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 
129, 129-30 (2002). Smith states: 
Under COINTELPRO, the FBI developed over five hundred thousand domestic 
intelligence files on American citizens and groups, opening sixty-five thousand 
files in 1972 alone. The FBI also kept a list of twenty-six thousand individuals to 
be rounded up in case of a "national emergency" .... Over a six year period, the 
CIA, under Operation Chaos, collected thirteen thousand files and other materials 
including the names ofthree hundred thousand people and organizations. 
Smith, supra note 193, at 259 (citing Schlagheck, supra note 193, at 102-03). 
194. Elijah, supra note 193, at 130. The Church Committee (officially called the 
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities), which issued the Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. REp. No. 94-755 (1976) (commonly 
known as the "Church Committee" Report), found that the government's activity threatened 
the rights of "privacy, free speech and freedom of association." Smith, supra note 193, at 
259; see also William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security 
Surveillance, 50·AM. U. L. REV. 1,33-34 (2000) (citing S. REP. No. 94-755, at 424-25). 
Banks and Bowman stated: 
For fifteen months the Church Committee, spurred by allegations of 
wrongdoing within the national intelligence system, conducted the first major 
inquiry of the intelligence community. The Committee found multiple 
shortcomings in intelligence operations, adverse effects of secrecy, failure by 
Congress to oversee intelligence activities, and in some cases, seemingly unlawful 
actions. More often, they found that activities of the intelligence community had 
violated individual privacy. 
The Committee determined that secret govemment activities, while necessary 
to the effectiveness of government, were, nevertheless, a threat to democratic 
society. 
Banks & Bowman, supra note 194, at 33-34. The intelligence abuses were so great that: 
"[B]efore COINTELPRO was laid to rest, it was responsible for maiming, 
murdering, false prosecutions and frame-ups, destruction, and mayhem 
throughout the country. It had infiltrated every organization and association that 
aspired to bring about social change in America whether through peaceful or 
violent means." 
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It is in this troubling historical context that the Hamdi decision must 
be placed. The excesses of the government particularly with respect to 
national security concerns are always a matter for close and careful judicial 
oversight. 195 The abdication of that responsibility by the Fourth Circuit can 
neither strengthen nor protect our security as a nation, because the 
fountainhead of our security as a nation lies precisely in our freedoms. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi to rely solely upon the 
government's bare allegations to strip a United States citizen of all of his 
constitutional protections is a disturbing and dangerous precedent. 196 It 
more than merely echoes the long discredited decision of Korematsu. 197 It 
compounds it. 
The Fourth Circuit decision ignores Korematsu's historical lessons 
with respect to the credibility of the government's assertions in national 
security matters. 198 It is in conflict with contemporary judicial decisions-
not only the district court decision it reversed but with another federal court 
Elijah, supra note 193, at 130; see also Saito, Seventh Annual Latcril Conference, supra 
note 34, at 1081-88 (recounting how the FBI used tactics of surveillance and infiltration, 
dissemination offalse information, creation of "intra- and inter-group conflict," abuse of the 
criminal system, and collaboration in assaults and assassinations). 
It is also worth noting the effect that government's reaction to September 11 has had on 
prisoners completely unrelated to that tragedy. Elijah, supra note 193, at 132-33. Numerous 
prisoners who have been incarcerated for politically related activities were suddenly 
adversely affected: 
Within hours of ... [September 11] several of ... [these prisoners] were rounded 
up and put in administrative segregation, generally known as the hole. No charges 
or allegations were levied against them .... 
Some, like Marilyn Buck, Sundiata Acoli ... and Richard Williams were held 
incommunicado for weeks without access to legal counsel .... 
. .. [O]n or about September 17, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a 
memorandum to the Bureau of Prisons directing them to terminate all 
communications, both social and legal, for certain prisoners. 
Elijah, supra note 193, at 132-33. (citations omitted). 
Moreover, Lynn Stewart, an attorney noted for her representation of controversial 
client-for example, David Gilbert, a former member of the Weather Underground and 
Bilal Sunni-AIi, a member of the Republic of New Africa convicted in connection with an 
armed robbery and shooting of a Brinks armored vehicle-has recently been indicted for 
allegedly facilitating communications between her client, Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, and 
"[t]he Islamic Group... described in the indictment as an 'international terrorist 
group ... '" Elijah, supra note 193, at 134-36. 
195. See Hamdi III, 316 F.3d 450, 463-65 (4th Cir. 2003). 
196. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d 450, 463-65 (4th Cir. 2003). 
197. 323 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1944). 
198. See Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 463. 
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reviewing identical material as well. I99 It reflects and exacerbates the 
underlying racial subtext of the "war on terror" just as the Korematsu case 
was driven by the racism of its era.200 Finally, it portends a greater danger 
in that it reinforces and helps to legitimate an already frenzied atmosphere 
of political repression reminiscent of the McCarthy era, facilitating and 
legitimatizing the imposition of conservative domestic policies, which have 
draconian effects upon people of color and other subordinated groups. 
Indeed, Hamdi is part of an even larger threat to American freedoms 
because it gives the veneer of judicial objectivity and neutrality to the same 
impulses, prejudices, and agenda that drove the late Senator from 
Wisconsin and his cronies to wreak havoc upon the American public and 
their Constitution.201 
EPILOGUE 
Mari Matsuda has sounded a call for those of us who are of Japanese 
American descent. She tells us that military necessity is never an excuse we 
can accept without question. We are Japanese American and our 
"birthright is to question military necessity. ,,202 
My family and community were once deemed enemy aliens. When they 
were herded into animal stalls at Tanforan Racetrack; when they were 
shipped to desolate deserts afraid and alone; when they were vilified by 
their country, very few Americans questioned "military necessity" then. 
Thus, with this piece I accept the responsibility that Mari has placed 
upon me and with it I exercise my birthright. I do so in the hope that others 
may escape the harsh consequences of the silence that political repression 
and "military necessity" impose. 
199. See Padilla I, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
200. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222-23. 
201. See Gott, supra note 18, at 211. 
202. Mari J. Matsuda, Asian Americans and the Peace Imperative, 27 AMERASIA J. 
141, 142 (2002). 
